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This thesis addresses the question of whether the 
Mifergui Joint Project can generate tax revenue for the 
governments of Guinea and Liberia and yet allow the foreign 
investors to realize the expected return on their 
investment.
The argument of taxing resource rent, if it exists, is 
that the tax does not impair the allocative efficiency of 
resources. In other words, a non-distortionary tax enables 
the government to tax away a share of the rents without 
impairing the financial incentives to search for new 
deposits and develop existing ones. In the case of Guinea 
and Liberia, the foreign investor must be encouraged to 
invest and recoup his profits to cover the risks, time, and 
other opportunities elsewhere.
The alternative tax regimes analyzed as scenarios in 
the thesis include royalties, income tax, government equity 
participation, and a combination of the above three, which 
is referred to as the mixed based regime. Having analyzed 
these scenarios of alternative tax regimes applicable to the 
Mifergui Joint Project, it is observed that although the 
project is economic before taxes, the imposition of any
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T-3853
royalty in excess of 2.5% of gross revenues will cause the 
DCFROR to fall below the expected rate of return assumed 
for the investors. On the other hand, the proposed income 
tax regime levied against the project will not impair the 
expected rate of return because the DCFROR after the income 
tax is above the minimum rate of return.
Based on the scenarios of alternative tax regimes 
analyzed, the scenario of mixed based regime with low rates 
of royalty, income tax and government equity is effective 
and meets the interests of the governments of Guinea and 
Liberia for continual, more certain and less volatile tax 
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The governments of Guinea and Liberia have been nego­
tiating with Liberian American Company (LAMCO) and France's 
Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) over a 
project that would exploit the iron deposits in Lola, Guinea 
(Mt. Nimba), 27 kilometers from the northern border of 
Liberia (Figure 1.1).
The Mifergui Joint Project appears promising from the 
point of view of total investment cost since existing mining 
facilities and infrastructure of LAMCO will be in place on 
the Liberian side when that company ceases operations in 
1989. Conceptual studies done in 1987 by Granges 
International Mining (GIM) and SOCOMINE, subsidiaries of 
LAMCO and BRGM, have mainly concentrated on the project's 
ability to service the debt and equity payments. These 
studies excluded royalty payments and taxation, an area of 
importance to the governments.
The need of developing countries for foreign exchange 
and economic development is the driving force for promoting 
private foreign investments in the mineral sector. The 
Mifergui Joint Project is no exception. The governments of 
Guinea and Liberia are in need of offshore funds to pursue 
their respective development objectives. On the other hand.
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private foreign investors are willing to invest only if the 
returns on their investments are adequate to cover the 
risks, time and opportunities elsewhere. Therefore, it is 
very important that fiscal policies of developing countries 
be applied in such a manner that the policies do not 
discourage foreign investment and simultaneously further the 
objectives of the country. Liberia and Guinea are equally 
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Figure 1.1 Location Map Showing the Mifergui Joint 
Project (Mt. Nimba, Lola) in Guinea
Source: Mining Magazine. October 1978
T-3853
1.1 Purpose
The overall objective of this study is to determine 
whether the Mifergui Joint Project can sustain some form of 
taxation and still remain economic. To achieve this 
objective, the study analyzes the impact of alternative 
fiscal regimes on the cashflow of the project and the 
implications for the governments and foreign investors. It 
also determines which tax regimes better meet the 
following government interests in tax system that :
-is neutral, i.e. that does not affect production 
decisions ;
-will maximize tax revenues;
-will reduce the variability and uncertainty of tax 
revenues (in the broad sense, to minimize risk);
These criteria will be evaluated with each scenario of 
alternative fiscal regime with the view of selecting that 
alternative which better meets the governments needs.
Since Liberia and Guinea negotiate fiscal systems 
applicable to a new project prior to entering a mining 
agreement, this study could be of some assistance to the 
governments in assessing the impact of each alternative tax 
policy on the project. This study also determines whether 
the Mifergui Joint Project could be taxed at all and if so, 




The Mifergui Joint Project is a very important iron 
ore project for Liberia and Guinea in terms of foreign 
exchange generation, economic development, and employment. 
For Liberia, this project could utilize existing 
infrastructure and port facilities, and the trained and 
experienced workforce of LAMCO, thus maintaining jobs and 
avoiding the quick deterioration of these facilities from 
corrosion and aggressive vegetation. For Guinea, the project 
could bring development to a remote sector of the country, 
and employment and training of nationals.
To assure the viability of this project, the 
governments need to assess their demands with the view to 
attracting private foreign investment. Although investing 
abroad for private foreign investors involves a number of 
issues apart from the arrangement and burden of government 
intake, this study will concentrate on the implications of 
varying composition of alternative fiscal regimes applicable 
to the Mifergui Joint Project and the bottom line effects on 
the projected cashflows. This study will avoid the issue of 
how tax revenues will be divided between Liberia and Guinea.
1.3. Motivation
The motivation for this thesis comes from the growing 
awareness of the need for mineral project decisions based on
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careful cashflow analysis with the view of implementing tax 
policies that tend to achieve a balance between government 
intake and returns to the private foreign investor.
However, such analyses require the maximum utility of data, 
information, and trained personnel which in most cases are 
limited in developing countries.
During initial negotiations of the Mifergui Joint 
Project, the government representatives often relied on 
results of analyses by private investors and then tried 
to seek modifications of the analyses to accommodate their 
positions and views. The process of negotiations became 
longer and more frustrating for all sides. Had the 
government representatives had access to software and 
hardware to do their own projected cashflow analysis in 
order to effectively determine just how the project should 
be taxed, costs and time could have been considerably 
reduced, thus eliminating unnecessary delays and taking 
advantage of the opportuned time of a smooth phasing-in 
period with LAMCO's phasing-out period.
The results of this thesis could be of some help to 
both Liberia and Guinea in dealing with the fiscal regimes 
question.
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1.4 Methodology and Organization
The methodology requires a review of alternative tax 
regimes and their application. With the cost data and 
parameters of the project available from the 1987 
feasibility study, a before-tax cashflow calculation is 
performed. The calculated before-tax cashflow is used as the 
base case for a series of scenarios of alternative tax 
regimes. These scenarios are then analyzed and assessed for 
their impacts on the base case cashflow of the project, 
expected rate of return on investment, payback period, and 
profitability. All analyses will be leveraged based on a 
capital structure ratio of 60% debt and 40% equity as per 
the wishes of the governments. The governments believe that 
such a ratio will enhance the interest of foreign equity 
investors for the project to be profitable. Although higher 
debt to equity ratio could further improve the economics of 
the project, the risk of higher interest payments and 
principal repayments is detrimental to the governments.
The most appropriate software for this study is the 
Software for Economic Evaluation (SEE) by John Stermole.
This software is designed mainly for economic evaluation and 
sensitivity analyses of projects of this nature. All costs 
of the project are in 1987 U. S. dollars.
Important data sources a include feasibility study 
conducted by GIM and Socomine; reports by the Liberian
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Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy; and cost data, and 
statistics of the LAMCO. A wide variety of additional 
sources is used for conceptual and additional information.
The organization of the thesis is as follows: chapter 1 
introduces the project, motivation, current status and 
progress, brief background history, and the socio-economic 
impact on the economies of the two countries. Chapter 2 
reviews alternative fiscal regimes and their applications. 
The project proposal to share benefits and risks is also 
analyzed. Chapter 3 assesses the prospects for the world 
iron ore market and prices. Chapter 4 presents the 
parameters and assumptions of the Mifergui Joint Project, 
capital cost estimates, and the base case cashflow analyses 
of the project. Chapter 5 deals with the impact of each 
alternative fiscal regime on the cashflows of the project. 
Additional important assumptions of variations in price, 
costs, and revenue are assessed for the effects on the 
cashflows of the project as well. Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions.
1.5 Brief History of the Project
The Pierre Richaud Mountains in Guinea contain proven 
ore reserves of 315 million metric tons and proven mineable 
ore reserves of 350 million metric tons of high grade iron 
(The TEX Report Co. 1987). These reserves are just 20
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kilometers from the Nimba mines in Liberia.
The government of Guinea and a subsidiary of USX 
(formerly US Steel) entered into a management agreement 
shortly before 1975, when the first study for feasible iron 
ore mine development of the Mt. Nimba iron ore deposit was 
completed by the Swedish consulting firm
Luossavaara-Kiirunanavaara AB. A second study was completed 
in October 1980 by Kaiser Engineering and Consultants in 
September 1982.
In October 1976, negotiations began with the Lamco 
Joint Venture for the use of the rail and port facilities. 
When agreements could not reached quickly and easily on the 
fees and other management matters, the latest agreement was 
negotiated in 1986 between the governments of Liberia and 
Guinea to join as partners whereby Guinea would make 
available the deposits and Liberia the port facilities and 
rail.
Matters have not been that simple. Mifergui-Nimba, a 
joint venture company between Guinea, holder of 50% A 
shares, and overseas participating companies, holders of the 
remaining 50% B shares, had capitalized at US$47.23 million 
(Appendix A). These diverse participating companies 
expressed unwillingness to continue as participating 
companies in the project. The question of how and who should 
be responsible to re-imburse these participating companies
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in order to obtain a waiver of their mining rights has been 
a major problem.
The latest project plan calls for 6 million tons 
production per year for 25 years. Total capital investment 
is estimated at US$270 million. This project plan calls for 
production to begin in 1990, although a production decision 
has yet to be made. Meanwhile, negotiations and project 
promotion are continuing in order to secure funding for the 
project, identify customers, and enter into agreements. 
Whether indeed the project itself will come on stream this 
year will depend on the outcome of these activities.
1.6 Socioecocomic Impact of the Project 
on Guinea and Liberia
Liberia has long been a mineral producing country. Iron 
ore alone accounts for 63.4% of total exports (World Bank 
1988). LAMCO was the largest Liberian producer with about 
45% of total production. With that company closing down 
operations, Liberia is in need of the Mifergui Joint 
Project. Guinea needs the project to reduce its dependence 
on bauxite which accounts for 80% of total Guinean exports.
The Mifergui Joint Project will have positive effects 
on the economies of the two countries in creating 
employment, contributing to the improvement of the balance 
of payments, developing regional infrastructure, generating
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public revenue from personal income taxes and direct 
taxation related to the activities of the project.
1.6.1 Creation of Employment
The project will not import unskilled and semi-skilled 
employees from other countries; thus, nationals of both 
countries will have an additional source of employment. The 
training and skills acquired by these nationals will be of 
tremendous help to the countries for future projects and a 
better life.
It is the understanding with the likely foreign 
investors that expatriate personnel will be gradually 
reduced and responsibilities assumed by nationals of the two 
countries.
The backward linkages will lead to the development of 
markets for local supplies, fresh fruits and vegetables, and 
local skills in carpentry, construction, transportation, 
etc. Fiscal linkages will be enhanced through tax revenues.
1.6.2 Contribution to the Improvement
of Balance of Payments
Like most developing countries, Guinea and Liberia have 
balance of payment burdens. The project will be a source of 
hard needed foreign exchange from tax revenue which could 
improve the balance of payments situation of these
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countries.
1.6.3 Development of Regional 
Inf rastructure
Development of local infrastructure will rise as the 
result of the project leading to development a network of 
roads in the region of Guinea and Liberia, creation of 
towns, schools, recreational facilities, housing facilities 
for employees, clinics, improvement of existing local 
medical services, electric power supply to the area, and 
local agriculture.
The project will boost economic activities in the 
region, thus reducing the migration of people from this 
region to the urban areas of Guinea and Liberia in search 
of work.
It is estimated that the Guinean and Liberian economies 
will benefit annual average contributions (excluding 
corporate income tax of about $3.7 million for Guinea and 
$13 million for Liberia) from the project through local 
subcontracting and purchases, services, etc. (Table 1.6).
ARTHUS LAKES LIBRARY
COLORADO SCHOOL of MINES 
GOLDEN, COLORADO 80401
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Table 1.6 Estimated Annual Contributions to the Economies 




and local construction 480 1,834





Taxes on income of personnel : 
Expatriate staff 370 2,624
Local staff 1,120 1,614
Workers 1,310 3,343
Local purchases 120 -
Government fees 304 200
Transportation - 217
Total 3,704 13,030
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint Project
T-3853 13
Chapter 2
REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE FISCAL REGIMES
The exploitation of mineral resources often gives rise 
to a resource rent that may be either captured by the 
government of the producing country in the form of taxes on 
mineral operation or be taken away by a private investor, 
perhaps in the form of monopoly or oligopoly rents.
The argument for taxing resource rent is that the taxes 
do not impair the allocative efficiency of resources if they 
are non-distortionary. According to Dore (1987), a 
non-distortionary tax enables government to tax away a share 
of rents without impairing the financial incentives to 
search for new deposits and develop existing ones.
Government revenue and foreign exchange earnings are 
the ultimate objectives of taxation provisions in mineral 
agreements. In addition, the right to levy taxes gives the 
government gradual control over the mining operations in the 
country, the ability to improve the human resources and the 
possibility of creating strong linkages between the 
extractive industries and the rest of the economy.
Palmer (1978) distinguishes the taxation issues in the 
manufacturing industry from those in the mining industry by 
the existence of resource rent and high geological, 
commercial, and political risks in the latter. An adequate
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mineral taxation policy should account for investor 
attitudes toward these types of risks as the imposition of 
taxes increases the possibility of negative outcomes and 
long expected payback periods. For this reason, Palmer 
(1978) further proposes that an equitable and efficient 
mineral tax regime should meet the following basic 
requirements :
-The investor's expected tax liability in the event of 
commercial exploitation should be predictable;
-Actual tax liability should be based on revealed ex­
post profitability to avoid the tensions arising from 
inaccurate ex-ante forecasts;
-Actual tax liability over a project's life should be 
no higher than for non-mining projects, where the 
mining project turns out to be marginal or worse (i.e., 
ex-post returns are less than or equal to the ex-ante 
supply price);
-Actual tax liability over a project's life should 
automatically capture for the government a high share 
the resource rent (i.e., profits in excess of the 
ex ante supply price of investment);
-The tax structure should minimize distortions in the 
allocation of resources and preserve incentives for 
marginal efficiency;
Bosson and Varon (1978) also pointed out that investors
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must be allowed a normal return on their capital because a 
high tax rate will discourage investment and jeopardize the 
operations in existing mines. The central problem of the 
implementation of an adequate taxation policy will thus 
depend on how effectively the government reconciles his 
goals with the sometimes conflicting goals of the foreign 
investors.
Radetzki and Kumar (1987) identified four types of 
fiscal regimes frequently applicable to mineral extraction 
in the developing countries. These four are royalty based, 
income tax based, government participation based, and mixed 
based regimes, and are reviewed and analyzed respectively 
against the cashflows of the Mifergui Joint Project. Other 
elements of a fiscal regime--such as administrative fees, 
export and import taxes, and artificial exchange rates used 
by governments to capture a major share of profits from 
mining operation--are ignored for the purpose of this study.
2.1 Royalty Regimes
Royalties are the oldest form of mineral taxation and 
provide a more stable source of government revenue in 
periods of fluctuating profits than a tax on rent. Royalty 
payment may be based on a physical unit of production or 
shipment, or on the value of the production or shipment. The 
rate may be constant for a particular mineral or it may vary
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with the quality or price of the ore. The royalty may be 
deductible for corporate income tax purposes, or it may be 
neither deductible nor creditable. It may be taken in cash 
or kind. If based on value, the royalty may be based on 
actual realized prices or on a reference, or posted price.
According to Smith and Wells (1975), royalties based on 
physical units of production have been the easiest to 
administer because they do not involve price determination. 
They have tended, however, to decrease in real value because 
of inflation over the life of the concession agreement. To
minimize the erosion of value and to capture for the
government some of the increased profits when prices of the 
raw materials rise, many agreements have abandoned the 
physical unit bases in favor of a royalty based on value.
The reference is ordinarily the sales price of the ore or a 
published price of the ore or metal.
A mineral royalty satisfies the following conditions 
(Faber 1982):
-A royalty is payment to the owner of the mineral right
for the right to extract and sell the ore. Royalties
have been the traditional charge for depletion (Walde 
1982);
-Royalty is levied on production and should be varied 
with the value of the ore being mined;
-It should be designed such that the increase in the
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value of the ore accrues to the owner of mineral 
rights.
So-called "sliding-scale" royalties are structured such 
that royalty rates are reduced when mining income falls (and 
vice versa). Such royalties actually begin to resemble 
income taxes.
2.2 Income Tax Regimes
Income taxes and royalties affect the business 
decisions of a mining company differently. As Hartwick and 
Olewiler (1986) point out, a tax on rent will have no effect 
on the extraction decision of an operating mine. Thus an 
income tax is neutral and non-distortionary provided that it 
is based on the resource rent of operating mines. If P(t) 
is the price per tonne of the production at t and c is the 
cost of production per tonne per year, then according to the 
Hotelling rule, the flow condition will be :
P(t) - c = (p(t+l) - c)/(l+r) (1)
The equation expresses the relation between the net 
benefit of the marginal unit extracted (or the resource rent 
(P(t) - c) and the present value of the rent in each period. 
Its main implication is that rent (or mineral profit) per 
tonne grows over time at the market interest rate r.
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Given this flow condition, the imposition of taxes and 
royalties on mining operations affects the production deci­
sions as follows:
-Case of neutral tax on resource rent: the imposition 
of a tax rate on the rent affects the flow equation (1) as 
follows :
(1 - T)(P(t) - c) = (1 - T)(p(t + 1) - c)/(l+r) (2)
The term (1 - T) can be cancelled from both sides of
the equation (2) without affecting the equality because rent
in each period is taxed exactly the same. There is no way 
the mine operator can avoid the tax by shifting production. 
This implies that a tax on rent is likely to have a neutral 
impact on production decisions.
-Case of a royalty: the imposition of a royalty as a 
fixed rate R of gross revenue from mineral sales has an 
effect analogous to a rise in the cost of extraction. The 
royalty reduces the price received from P(t) to (1 - R)*P(t) 
by the firm for each unit of mineral sold and thus, the 
present value of the mine. If sales are postponed, the 
effect of this reduction will be minimized because of the 
discount factor. The flow condition is affected as follows:
(1 - R)*P(t) - c = ((1 - R)*p(t + 1) - c)/(l + r) (3)
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Contrary to the neutral tax case, the term (1-R) can 
not be cancelled from both sides of equation (3) without 
affecting the equality. Thus, if equality was to be 
maintained, the competitive mining firm will reduce output 
until price is equal to marginal costs c plus marginal 
royalty payments R*P(t).
An additional-profits tax is a form of resource rent 
taxation. It allows the host government to levy additional 
higher income tax rate on profits above the minimum rate of 
return on investment. While such a scenario could have been 
applicable to the Mifergui Joint Project, it is rejected for 
Liberia or Guinea owing to a lack of established and 
organized tax institutions and technical capabilities.
2.3 Government Participation Regime
Government participation regime is permitting the 
government to acquire part of the equity in the mineral 
enterprise free or on concessional terms.
Equity-holding has an appeal for some governments 
because of the impression it gives of ownership and control. 
As Garnaut and Ross (1985) point out, equity-holding (even 
majority holding) is in fact neither a necessary nor a suf­
ficient condition for effective control: not necessary 
because the required legislation to establish control can be
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passed ad hoc, and not sufficient because effective control 
demands appropriate expertise at the disposal of the govern­
ment .
Whenever a government insists on the acquisition of 
equity in a project without paying what could be considered 
a market price, it is imposing a cost on the investor that 
is similar in its fiscal effect to additional taxation.
It makes sence that when a government contributes to 
investment, it should be rewarded with equity in no less 
than the same proportion as the private investor is rewarded 
for his own investment outlay.
The fiscal implications of government participation in 
equity basically depend on the terms of the acquisition. If 
government pays for its shares in cash at the market price, 
there will be no fiscal extraction. Valuation of the equity 
will be an important determinant of the benefit that accrues 
to the government in all cases where the transfer of the 
shares is at a price other than their market price. In many 
instances, the government is allocated a share of the equity 
in exchange for its contribution in kind to the mineral pro­
ject. These contributions may simply consist of a permis­
sion to mine, or of infrastructural installations provided 
for by the government. The fiscal extraction in such cases 
will depend on the way the government's contributions are 
valued.
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Another common arrangement for the government's equity 
acquisition is through "carried interest" (Kumar and 
Radetzki, 1987). Here, the government pays for the equity 
through a loan obtained from or arranged by the multina­
tional mining firm. The principal and interest rate are then 
paid from the government's share of the dividends from the 
project. The government's general credit worthiness along 
with the rate of interest on the loan are additional deter­
minants for the amount of fiscal extraction under this 
arrangement.
2.4 Mixed Regime
For the purpose of this study, a mixed regime is 
referred to as a combination of royalty, income tax and some 
form of government participation as equity-holding.
The fact that different forms of tax regime have dif­
ferent advantages and disadvantages raises the possibility 
that some combination of taxes might be devised to reap a 
mixture of advantages. Governments often do impose a variety 
of special taxes. In Liberia for example, in addition to 
payment of royalties, import duties, and consular fees, 
income tax is often levied against mining firms.
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2.5 Application of The Four Fiscal 
Regimes
The application of the different forms of fiscal 
regimes discussed above will depend on the advantages and 
disadvantages, the objectives of the government, and 
prevailing circumstances.
Although royalty payments affect production decisions 
by imposing additional costs to the producer, they maintain 
a steady flow of revenue to the government in periods of 
declining profits or losses from mining operations, assuming 
stable production.
In spite of these advantages, the problem of 
administering a royalty based on sales revenue may be 
considerable owing to the problem of transfer pricing with 
affiliated customers. In an effort to avoid the pricing 
problem, some royalties have been based on a downstream 
product. Such a price may be used when it is observed to 
vary roughly with the value of the ore.
Walde (1989) maintains that royalties tend to 
discourage marginal projects and encourage inefficient 
high-grading. Royalties add to mineral production costs and 
therefore raise the cut-off grade in mining. Consequently, 
high royalties encourage mineral producers to exploit only 
the high grade deposits although this might not have been 
economically justifiable had the production costs been
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unaffected by the royalties. Thus, royalties encourage a 
rapid depletion of high quality and low cost deposits and 
work against low grade deposits.
Walde also point out that royalties can be flexible as 
noted in Guyana in 1982, where royalties on uranium were 
reduced for the first years of operation. This improved the 
investor's net present value calculations, and encouraged 
investment. Examples include Thailand, where royalties are 
discounted by 50% on minerals for local processing; Jamaica 
(1984-85), where the royalty-like bauxite levy is lower for 
high-volume production to provide an incentive to maintain 
production; and Liberia, where royalties on iron ore from 
Bong Mining Company are discounted 50% during periods of 
losses by the company.
The problem with this flexibility of royalties is that 
it depends on the government in existence to agree to a 
reduction. Normally, firms would prefer to minimize such 
risks. Since no positive taxable income exists during bad 
years characterized by losses due to depressed market 
conditions or high operating costs, the royalty appears to 
be the only source of government revenue from mining 
operations in these conditions.
Income taxes are universally applied to mining 
operations. The tax rates vary between 25% and 50% (Glushke 
1985). A neutral income tax has many advantages compared to
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royalties both the producing country and the tax paying 
producer.
Among the many advantages of a profit-based tax is that 
such a tax does not affect the net marginal return to the 
mine operator because it does not raise the costs by the 
amount of the tax paid. Thus an income tax may benefit a 
producing country in the sense that mine production is not 
altered solely toward high grade deposits at the detriment 
of marginal deposits. The government can also use the tax 
system to provide incentives for investment in new mines by 
emphasizing one or more of the following provisions of an 
income tax;
-All operating costs including labor, materials and 
supplies, freight, interest paid, royalties and sever­
ance taxes may be directly expensed against existing 
income.
-Exploration outlays can be either expensed or capital­
ized at the election of the taxpayer (McCabe 1985). 
-Development expenditures can be deferred and expensed 
as the ore is sold.
-Tax holidays can be granted by the government if no 
profit can be expected during the initial years of the 
mining project.
-Tax differentials in favor of undeveloped areas can 
be used as an incentive to invest in backward areas.
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Companies can defer their tax payments during bad years 
through a provision for loss carry forward.
-Capital investments can be recouped in a short time 
through depreciation allowances.
The profitability of mining operations is usually 
determined by the internal rate of return (IRR) and the net 
present value of the discounted cashflows (NPV). Johnson 
(1981) identifies the main problems in the application of 
IRR criteria as the adjustment of inflation (current or 
constant dollar terms); the inconsistency in adjusting 
prices, costs, or investments for inflation or escalation; 
and confusion between return on equity and return on assets, 
which includes both debt and equity. The NPV is more 
appropriate in government analysis of profit in situations 
where it is assumed that the government has not incurred any 
direct outlay for the project. As such, the cashflow in 
every year is positive.
Stermole and Stermole (1987) note that the key to cor­
rect and successful economic evaluation work rests heavily 
on the experience with proper methods for the following 
evaluation points:
-correct handling of all allowable income tax deduc­
tions to determine correct taxable income,
-adding back to net profit the proper non-cash deduc­
tions to obtain cashflow;
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-proper handling of tax considerations for costs that 
may be written off for tax purposes in the year in 
which they are incurred against other income, rather 
than being capitalized and deducted over a period of 
time greater than one year;
-correct accounting for tax effects on salvage value, 
either tax to be paid or tax writeoffs to be taken,
etc.
The drawback of income taxes from a government's 
perspective is the administrative costs of determining the 
level of profit and collecting taxes. This may be 
complicated by the practice of transfer pricing and the use 
of complicated profit and cost accounting techniques by the 
foreign investor. The fact that profits are very 
unpredictable from year to year adds to the drawbacks of an 
income tax regime. Since taxes are based on reported 
profits, there is no government tax revenue during the years 
of reported losses.
Government participation has the potential of raising 
the attractiveness of resource development to an investor.
It is commonly suggested that sovereign risk (the risk owing 
to the possibility of adverse action by the government) is 
reduced by the government equity investment in a resource 
project. Prior knowledge of government intentions may thus 
reduce investor uncertainty and supply price of investment.
ARTIiXJB LAXES LIBRARY 
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and increase the amount of economic rent.
However, as Walde notes (1989), the recent bleak 
outlook for metals prices, the difficulties developing 
countries face in obtaining and replacing loans, and the 
unprofitability of most public mineral investment make it 
unlikely that government participation in mineral 
development will expand much in the near future. What is 
urgently required for these governments is the establishment 
and the strengthening of technical capabilities to 
understand, follow and monitor activities of mining 
companies on their territory and in the international metals 
markets.
Mixed based fiscal policies have the advantage of 
assuring the government of revenue not only during the 
production stage but also during the early life of a 
project. Mixed based fiscal policies tend to reduce the 
present value of economic rent generated in mining. On the 
other hand, because of the requirements of creditability, 
where the foreign producer gets tax credits for income taxes 
paid on earnings outside his home country, host governments 
may introduce considerations in favor of combining rent 
taxes with income taxes (Garnaut and Ross 1985).
T-3853 28
2.6 Project Proposals to Share Benefits 
and Risks
The major area of conflict within the Mifergui Joint 
Project has been the issue of sharing benefits and risks.
The governments want to receive tax revenue and royalties 
while the private investors would prefer the project to be 
tax-free. While LAMCO prefers no royalty payments to the 
governments, BRGM could accommodate royalties if based on a 
fixed amount equal to a user fee for the existing 
infrastructure.
The proposal by LAMCO emphasizes the principle of 
income sharing between the Guinean and Liberian parties and 
distribution of the remaining cash among Guinea, Liberia, 
and new shareholders.
The proposal by BRGM, on the other hand, has allowances 
for royalties, import taxes and user fees. These payments, 
however, must equal in total to the amount paid for equity 
service under priority 3 and must be calculated based on net 
revenue.
While negotiations have proceeded to other matters, the 
issue of taxation and royalties has yet to be resolved. 
Meanwhile, the analyses made in the feasibility study 
concluded that the Mifergui Joint Project is economically 
viable with a before tax constant rate of return on 
investment of 14.6% (GIM and Socomine 1987). This rate of
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return differs from the the base case of this study because 
of different assumptions about revenue, minimum rate of 
return, and inflation.
Table 2.1 contains the proposals of each foreign group 
associated with the project to share the benefits and risks 
of the project. The proposals identify order of priority 
cost deductions from total revenue each year in order to 
determine the surplus to be shared.
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Table 2.1 Proposals to Calculate and Share Any 
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Source: Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy, Liberia 1987
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Chapter 3 
PROSPECTS FOR THE WORLD IRON 
ORE MARKET
The profitability of the Mifergui Joint Project will 
depend on developments in the world iron and steel industry. 
At present, the world iron ore market is depressed because 
of oversupply, high interest rates, etc. The Mifergui 
Project will face stiff competition for the European market 
from big producers such as Brazil and Australia.
In view of these adverse conditions, this study reviews
the world iron ore market, price developments, and the
future outlook of the iron ore industry.
3.1 Assessment of the Iron Ore Market
Iron ore is an important metallic ore due to its large 
quantity and importance as an input in the production iron 
and steel. The important producing countries include the 
USSR, Brazil, Australia, China, and the United States. Major 
consumers are the industrial countries of North America,
Europe and Japan which are the leading iron and steel 
producers.
Nearly all iron ore produced in the world is used in 
the manufacture of iron and steel. The ferrous raw materials 
for steelmaking are pig iron, which is produced in a blast
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furnace; sponge iron, which is produced by direct reduction 
process; and scrap steel.
Iron ore has a number of minor end uses not connected 
with the production of iron and steel, chiefly in cement and 
the coal washing, as a high density aggregate in concrete, 
and in pigments. It may also be used as the medium in 
heavy-media separation plants for the beneficiation of 
minerals. Small amounts are also used in the production of 
ferrite ceramic magnets, refractories, foundry sands, 
fertilizers, stockfeeds, medicines, recording tapes, 
catalysts, in welding rod coatings and on jig screens in 
mineral concentration plants. All these put together may 
account for around 1 percent of total world consumption 
(British Geological Survey 1988).
The demand for iron ore is determined by the demand for 
primary iron and steel. By far the most important 
determinant of the demand for iron ore is the level of world 
production of crude steel. Iron ore production has increased 
since 1950 except for 1977 and 1982. These were years of 
high energy costs and stagnating demand for metals and 
minerals in general. The years of increased iron ore 
production coincided with a period of high demand for steel. 
This trend, however, reversed sharply in 1977 and 1982 when 
demand for steel stagnated and prices eroded. Steelmills 
cut down their iron ore intakes which created an oversupply
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situation for iron ore markets.
Most developing countries continued to produce despite 
the demand constraint in order to satisfy foreign exchange 
needs and national development. Also, iron ore producing 
capacities had been expanded during the late 1950s and 1960s 
to take advantage of high demand. As a result, competition 
between producers has toughened. Several high cost producers 
have lost market shares to new low cost and high grade 
producers in Brazil, India, and Venezuela. The recent rise 
in ocean freight rates have also put more distant suppliers, 
such as Australia, and Liberia, at a disadvantage.
With improvement in the steel industry, iron ore 
producers can expect demand growth and thus, a better 
opportunity for the Mifergui Project. The financial outlook 
for the steel industry has continued to improve (U.S. Bureau 
of Mines 1989).
During the 1989-2000 period, world iron ore demand is 
expected to increase by an average growth rate of 1.8% per 
year. Japan, the United States, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany are expected to have the largest increases in 
consumption of iron ore among the industrial countries in 
response to their steel supply needs (World Bank 1988b).
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Figure 3.2 World Production of Steel Ingots 
and Castings, 1950-1988 
(in thousand tons)




Unlike most commodities, iron ore is not traded on a 
competitive exchange. Most trade is conducted on the basis 
of long term contracts, with prices set annually. While 
prices are negotiated separately, the price trend normally 
follows the prices of the Brazilian-European trade. Figure
3.3 shows the price trends of Brazilian sinter fines 65%, 
cost, freight and insurance North Sea ports in constant 1980 
US dollars between 1960 to 1988.
Prices for Liberian iron ore follow the price set cost 
freight and insurance Rotterdam of similar sinter fines like 
that of Kiruna, Swedan. Both Brazilian and Swedish prices 
basically reflect the world price trend with small 
adjustments for the quality of the ore type. Secondly, being 
a Swedish company, GIM has access to early price information 
of Kiruna for its own negotiations for the Liberian ore. The 
yearly average price of 60% Swedish ore cost, insurance and 
freight Rotterdam are expressed in constant US dollars from 
1955 to 1986.
While iron ore prices continued to fall in the 1980s 
due to oversupply, most pundits believe the 90*s will see a 
more regular growth in the levels of steel production with 
iron ore demand and supply better balanced than the 80*s. 
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Figure 3.3 Annual Average Price of 65% Brazilian Ore 
c.i.f. North Sea ports, 1960-1986 
(in constant 1980 US dollars per metric ton)
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Figure 3.4 Annual Average Price of 60% Swedish Ore 
c.i.f. Rotterdam, 1954-1986 (in constant 
1980 US dollars per metric ton)
Source: World Bank. 1988a
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3.3 Future Outlook
The decline in primary commodity prices in the early 
1980s was due to a number of factors; one of which was the 
increase in supplies of primary commodities. Growth of 
industrial production in industrial countries was the main 
factor affecting commodity prices until the second quarter 
of 1985 (World Bank 1988a). Since then, the growth rate of 
industrial production has been too low to have a significant 
positive impact on commodity prices.
The supply of iron ore has continued to exceed demand.
Consequently, prices have fallen. Recent forecasts about 
iron ore price trends expect prices to remain steady at 
levels justifying the necessary new flow of investment in 
mines.
A price of $15.00/mt freight on board Monrovia is used
for the purpose of this study. Although this price could be
considered optimistic freight on board Monrovia, the author 
believes it can be justified based on recent Liberian iron 
ore prices. Although the 1987 price freight on board 
Monrovia was $14/mt, 9% down from the 1986 level, the 1988 
price increased by 7.5% to 15.10/mt. Also, the price used 
for this study is reasonable in view of prices prevailing 
for Brazilian and Swedish iron ores.
The assumption here of $15.00/mt is broadly consistent 
with World Bank projections (World Bank 1988b). The World
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Bank iron ore price projections for the 1990s are between 
$18.20 m/t and $17.0/mt c.i.f. European ports. Embarkation 
freight on board Monrovia requires c.i.f. price less the 
freight cost, which would require a price within the 
estimated price range of $15.00 m/t.
The World Bank iron ore actual price from 1950 to 1987 
and projected price from 1988 to 2000 are in Figure 3.5. The 
forecasts are presented in 1985 constant dollar terms and up 
to year 2000, the price forecasts are of the average levels 
expected during the period. The prices are deflated by the 
World Bank's Manufacturing Unit Value (MUV) index. The MUV 
index is the c.i.f. index of U.S. dollar prices of 
industrial countries' manufactured exports to developing 
countries and may be regarded as a useful deflator to 
measure changes in the net barter terms of trade of 
developing countries highly dependent on exports of primary 
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Figure 3.5 World Bank Iron Ore Prices 1950-1987 (actual) 
and 1988-2000 (projected) (in 1985 constant 
dollars per metric ton)
Source: World Bank. 1988b
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Chapter 4 
PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF 
THE MIFERGUI JOINT PROJECT
The Mifergui Joint Project is currently under 
negotiation with the view of commencing the project in 
1990 in order to take advantage of the existing facilities 
and infrastructure of LAMCO which are expected to shut down 
operation very soon. Notwithstanding, this study analyzes a 
series of scenarios of alternative tax regimes with the view 
of assessing their respective impact on the cashflows of the 
project. With such information, the governments can better 
decide which form of taxation to levy against the project.
This study utilizes the parameters of the Mifergui 
Joint Project and some assumptions to determine the base 
case cashflows.
4.1 The Base Case Project Parameters 
and Assumptions
The costs for the initial investment for the start of 
the project, the subsequent additional investments during 
the 25-year operation, as well as the operating costs for 
the project were estimated by GIM and Socomine on the basis 
of cost and price levels prevailing at the end of February 
1987. The estimates of all costs are presented in the 1987
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feasibility report of the Mifergui Joint Project (GIM and 
Socomine 1987), It is the assumption that price lists by 
customers of LAMCO for equipment and supplies and LAMCO^s 
experience in the iron ore business over the years 
contributed greatly to these estimates. All estimates are 
presented in 1987 U.S. dollars.
The following are the main parameters and assumptions 
of the project (the cost assumptions are discussed more 
fully later in the chapter).
1. Cost of initial investments in 1990 is assessed at 
$25 million for site development, $111 million for 
mining equipment, and $49 million for heavy and 
light trucks for a total of $185 million including 
$15 million of working capital.
2. Maintenance of the operation will require additional 
subsequent investments of $28 million in 1991, 1998, 
and 2008.
3. The investment will be financed by 40% in direct 
equity and 60% in loans at an interest rate of 10% 
repayable in equal installments during years 1 to 
15. The equity will be redeemed in equal 
installments during years 6 to 25 at 14% fixed 
dividends. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
governments favor a debt to equity ratio of 60/40.
4. Production of iron ore will start in 1990 and will
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amount to 5.2 million tons in that year. Production 
will rise to full capacity of 6 million tons the 
following year through the 25th year. All production 
is assumed to be sold and payments received within 6 
weeks.
5. Operating costs per metric ton of iron ore is 
assessed at $9.10 in 1990, $9.15 in 1991-1994,
$8.97 in 1995-1999, $8.83 in 2000-2004, $8.80 in 
2005-2009, and $8.83 in 2010-2014.
6. All taxes, royalties, interest and dividends are 
assumed to be paid in the year of assessment.
7. Ore price is assumed to be $15.00 per ton. (Refer 
to previous section.)
8. Depreciation costs of tangible mining equipment 
will be determined by the straight line method. 
Amortization of extraordinary investments will be 
5 years.
9. The project is assumed to have no salvage value at 
the end of the 25th year.
10. Minimum rate of return on investment is assumed at 
22%. This is close to the nominal minimum rates 
stated to be acceptable by foreign investors in the 
mineral industry (Radetzki and Kumar 1987)
11. Owing to the economic situation in Guinea and 
Liberia inflation is assumed at 7%.
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The above points identify the Mifergui Joint Project. 
Although iron ore price is assumed constant in the 
feasibility study of the project, for the purpose of this 
study, sensitivities for variation in prices, operating 
costs, and investment costs are analyzed.
Using today's dollars as the basis for evaluation 
calculations involves one of two different assumptions.
Either it be assumed that today's dollars equal escalated 
dollar values or that today's dollar equal constant dollar 
values. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that 
today's dollar value equal escalated dollar value based on 
the "washout assumption". The assumption implies that any 
escalation of operating costs each year will be offset 
(washed out) by the same dollar escalation of revenue. This 
assumption, however, only applies to revenues and operating 
costs in the revenue generating years.
The "washout assumption" is an escalated dollar 
assumption, so that an escalated dollar minimum rate of 
return must be used in NPV calculations and for ROR analysis 
decisions (Stermole and Stermole 1987).
If the primary concern was assessing the economic 
viability of the project, rather than evaluating an 
alternative tax scenarios, the capital costs, occuring in 
later years, as well as operating costs would be escalated 
by the assumed inflation rate.
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4.2. Cost Estimates
As noted in the 1987 feasibility study of the Mifergui 
Joint Project; the costs of all equipment and plants forming 
part of the permanent installations for the project, as well 
as work on site, have been based on duty free imports and 
other government charges. For the purpose of this study, the 
technique used to determine the capital costs, operating 
costs, and the working capital are assessed.
4.2.1 Capital Costs
For the capital costs estimates, the existing 
facilities and infrastructures are available without charge.
It is agreed that the contribution from Liberia for the 
project will be these existing facilities of the Lamco 
operations, of which the government of Liberia is the 
majority owner.
The capital cost estimates include the costs for a 
reasonable stock of spare parts for new equipment, the 
engineering and construction, management, and a factor for 
contingencies in the range of 5-10%.
The initial investments cover direct investment costs 
for new facilities, costs for modifications to and exten­
sions of the existing facilities, and costs for general 
improvements of facilities within the industrial and commu­
nity areas up to year 1.
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The additional investments relate to facilities 
required after start-up of production in the mine and re­
investments required for the operations over the 25 years 
operating period. This amount is split on mine, railroad, 
ore processing and general operations.
4.2.2 Working Capital
Working capital is estimated based on the value of 
the overall warehouse stocks left from ongoing Lamco Joint
Venture operations by the end of 1989. Other major items are
the ore in process and stock of finished products together 
with the financing of invoices from date of shipment to date 
of actual payment.
The capital costs required for the technical stockpile 
are valued based on the cost to produce the stockpile, 
multiplied by the amount of stockpile, and the cost of 
invoice financing period for 6 weeks. The yearly technical 
stockpile will be 800,000 tons. Therefore, the working 
capital is estimated as follows:
800,000 tons * $9.10/t = $7.3 million; and
invoice financing for 6 weeks will cost:
6,000,000 tons * $13.5/t * 6/52 = $9 million.
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The total of $16.3 million is estimated to be the 
working capital.
4.2.3 Operating Costs
The approach used to estimate the operating costs for 
the Mifergui Joint Project is to separately determine the 
costs in both Guinea and Liberia of personnel, power, fuel, 
consumables, spare parts, services and general for the 6 
million ton project. These costs are then summed per year to 
determine estimated operating cost per ton. Operating 
costs for activities in Liberia are based on operating costs 
listed in LAMCO's cost budget with due adjustments for 
changes in salaries and wages for local staff and workers 
and on experience as to consumption of material, fuel and 
power, etc., in the present LAMCO operations. These 
estimates are used for the base case cashflows.
The operating cost estimates for Guinea were largely 
based on the experience of Socomine and the operating costs 
LAMCO.
Standard salary and wage structures and common 
employment terms and conditions for the workforce in Liberia 
were adopted as per the feasibility study (Table 4.1).
Basic hourly rates for wages are based on a working 
schedule of 48 hours per week, which corresponds to 45 hours
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of effective work and one shift per day, according to LAMCO. 
Overtime, shift allowance, and other personnel charges are 
added to the annual costs as a percentage calculation for 
each function, based on current statistics of LAMCO.
Table 4.1 Distribution of Personnel and Salary 
Classification in Liberia (USD/year)
Exp staff Local staf f Workers
Job
Class No. USD No. USD
Job
Class No. cent/hr USD
K 1 70,000 9 57 1.37 3,420
J 2 60,000 1 24,000 8 73 1.47 3,670
I 6 49,000 2 20,700 7 63 1.34 3,340
H 14 42,300 7 18,200 6 232 1.20 3,000
G 40 33,200 11 11,400 5 89 1.10 2,750
F 35 27,700 42 9,300 4 229 1.02 2,550
E 27 24,400 44 7,000 3 24 0.93 2,320
D 0 - 75 5,500 2 40 0.97 2,410
C 0 - 10 4,000 1 0 -
Total 125 192 806
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint Project 
- Conceptual Study
Note: The job classification systems of categories k 
to c and numbers 9 to 1 are used by LAMCO for 
various management levels of expatriates and 
local staff and workers as per job function and 
duties.
Manpower requirement for the operation in Liberia will 
amount to 125 expatriate staff, 192 local staff, and 806 
other workers. For the operations in Guinea, the required
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manpower will be 52 expatriate staff, 55 local, and 367 
other workers. Total employees amount to 1597. Distribution 
of personnel and salary scale are presented in Table 4.2 
for Guinea.
It is agreed that existing facilities and trained 
manpower on the Liberian side will be fully utilized.
The cost estimates for fuel consumption and power are 
based on the unit costs presented in Table 4.3 and operating 
costs in Guinea and Liberia are presented in tables 4.4 and 
4.5.
Table 4.2 Distribution of Personnel and Salary 
Classification in Guinea (USD/year)
Exp . staff Local staff Workers
Job
Class No. USD No. USD
Job
Class No cent/hr USD
13 1 70,000 07 60 1.37 3,420
12 7 60,000 - 24,000 06 193 1.47 3,670
11 9 49,000 - 20,700 05 0 1.34 3,340
M5 0 42,000 13 18,200 04 98 1.20 3,000
M4 0 33,000 14 11,400 03 0 1.10 2,750
M3 17 27,700 0 9,300 02 16 1.02 2,550
M2 18 24,400 0 7,000 01 0 0.93 2,320
Ml 0 - 28 5,500 00 0 0.97 2,410
Total 52 55 367
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint Project 
- Conceptual Study
Note: Job classifications between expatriates, local 
staff, and workers for Guinea are based on 
Socomine's system of job classification as per 
job and duties.
COLO^DO SCHOOL ct 
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Table 4.3 Estimate Unit Costs of Fuel and Power
Heavy fuel 12.0 cent/litre
Diesel 24.2 cent/litre
Gasoline 23.0 cent/litre
Distr. Power Yekepa 5.4 cent/kwh
Distr. Power Buchanan 5.3 cent/kwh
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint 
Project - Conceptual Study
Table 4.4 Estimates of Operating Costs in Guinea
(in thousand 1987 dollars)
Tear tif. O il. io rkari Powr h # i Mil. P u t t  Otrvi G eiertl Total
2ITT ' 808 130T 288 488 1280 2880 10?0 12183
2 2ITT 808 130T 288 488 1280 2880 10?0 12183
3 2STT 80S 130? 288 488 1280 2880 10?0 12183
4 2ITT 808 130? 288 488 1280 2880 10?0 12183
S 20TT 808 130? 288 488 1280 2880 10?0 12183
1 I IM 883 1288 288 488 1000 2822 1?10 11120
T 1811 883 1288 288 488 1000 2822 1?10 11120
1 1811 883 1288 288 488 1000 2822 1?10 11120
9 1881 883 1288 288 488 1000 2822 1?10 11120
10 1880 883 1281 288 488 1000 1?10 11120
11 030 1210 1288 288 422 1108 1443 1020?
12 030 1210 1288 288 422 1108 2T88 1443 1020?
13 030 1219 1288 288 422 1108 2?88 1443 1020?
14 030 1219 1288 288 421 1108 2?88 1443 1020?
IS 030 1210 1288 288 422 1108 2?88 1443 1020?
11 302 1448 1328 288 4?0 1308 2048 1312 10121
IT 302 1448 1328 288 4?0 1308 2048 1312 10121
11 300 1448 1328 288 4?0 1308 2048 1311 10121
10 302 1448 1328 288 4?8 1308 2048 1312 10121
20 302 1448 1328 288 4?0 1308 1312 10121
21 302 1448 1348 288 400 1203 8080 ? 1332 102T4
22 302 1448 1348 288 401 1288 3080 1332 102T4
23 302 1448 1148 288 400 1288 3080 1332 102T4
300 1448 1348 288 400 1288 3080 1331 102T4
2S 302 1448 1348 288 400 1208 3080 1331 102T4
Exp.= expatriate staff 
Gui.= Guinean staff 
Con.= consumables
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint Project 
- Conceptual Study
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Table 4.5 Estimates of Operating Costs of Liberia 
(in thousand 1987 dollars)
Year Bip. Lib. Workers Power Fuel Cons. Parts Services General Total
1 5921 2115 3176 3307 3448 2129 10378 7860 4027 42355
2 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
3 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
4 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
5 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
6 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
? 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
8 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
9 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
10 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
11 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
12 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
13 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
14 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
15 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
16 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
IT 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
• 18 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
' 19 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
20 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
21 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
22 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
23 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
24 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
25 5921 2115 3176 3375 3493 2132 10580 7860 4027 42355
Exp.z expatriate staff 
Lib.z Liberian staff 
con.z consumables
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint 
Project - Conceptual Study
The total operating cost estimates of the project are 
listed in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6 Estimates of Operating costs of the 
Mifergui Joint Project 
(in 1987 dollar per metric ton)
Year Bxp. Staff Workers Power Fuel Cobs. Parts services General Total $/ton
1 8599 2723 4483 3573 3904 3398 13258 8610 5997 54544 9.10
2 8599 2733 4483 3641 3949 3401 13460 8610 5997 54872 9.15
3 8599 2733 4483 3641 3949 3401 13460 8610 5997 54872 9.15
4 8599 2733 4483 3641 3949 3401 13460 8610 5997 54872 9.15
5 8599 2733 4483 3641 3949 3401 13460 8610 5997 54872 9.15
6 7807 2998 4461 3641 3922 3231 13402 8610 5737 53809 8.97
7 7807 2998 4461 3641 3922 3231 13402 8610 5737 53809 8.97
8 7807 2998 4461 3641 3922 3231 13402 8610 5737 53809 8.97
9 7807 2998 4461 3641 3922 3231 13402 8610 5737 53809 8.97
10 7807 2998 4461 3641 3922 3231 13402 8610 5737 53809 8.97
11 6851 3334 4461 3641 3915 3327 13366 8610 5470 52975 8.83
12 6851 3334 4461 3641 3915 3327 13366 8610 5470 52975 8.83
13 6851 3334 4461 3641 3915 3327 13366 8610 5470 52975 8.83
14 6851 3334 4461 3641 3915 3327 13366 8610 5470 52975 8.83
15 6851 3334 4461 3641 3915 3327 13366 8610 5470 52975 8.83
16 6223 3560 4502 3641 3963 3440 13523 8610 5339 52801 8.80
17 6223 3560 4502 3641 3963 3440 13523 8610 5339 52801 8.80
18 6223 3560 4502 3641 3963 3440 13523 8610 5339 52801 8.80
19 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5339 52801 8.80
20 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5339 52801 8.80
21 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 . 8610 5359 52955 8.83
22 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5359 52955 8.83
23 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5359 52955 8.83
24 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5359 52955 8.83
25 6223 3560 4525 3641 3992 3415 13630 8610 5359 52955 8.83
Exp.z expatriate staff 
S t a f f z  local staff 
C o n s . z  consumables
Source: GIM and Socomine. 1987. Mifergui Joint 
Project - Conceptual Study
T-3853 54
4.2.4 The Minimum Rate of Return
Normally, a firm deciding to invest in a project 
determines its minimum rate of return based on the market 
risk premium, the risk-free asset, and beta. Beta represents 
the average incremental percentage change in return 
(positive or negative) on the stock in relation to an 
incremental 1% change in return (positive or negative) on 
the S & P 500. Securities with higher betas are more 
sensitive to market fluctuations because, on average, they 
gain (lose) more when the S & P 500 rises (or falls)
(Brealey and Myers 1984).
Assuming the minimum rate of return for the project is 
calculated based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
the risk premium (RPm = Rm - Rf) that the investors demand 
could be assumed to be based solely on the covariance 
between the firm's stock returns and market returns or, 
equivalently, the stocks beta coefficient as set forth in 
the Security Market Line (SML) equation:
Ks = Rf + b(Rm - Rf) 
where: Ks = the required rate of return on common stock
Rf = the risk-free rate
b = beta, or the risk measure
Rm = the required market rate of return
The risk-free rate uses the long-term treasury bond 
rate as the base, which is reported daily in the Wall
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Street Journal. The required rate of return on the firm's 
stock, Ks, can be estimated given an estimate of Rf, b, and 
Rm.
According to Merrill Lynch analysis in 1989 (Haryanto 
1990), the market risk premium was estimated at 8.2%. The 
risk-free average rate for 1989 estimated at 7.9%. Beta for 
mining industry in U.S.A is estimated at 0.88 (Haryanto 
1990). Assuming beta for the mining industry of Liberia or 
Guinea is 15% higher than the U.S.A. because of the 
unfamiliar operating conditions and with a debt to equity 
ratio of 60/40, the beta of equity could be calculated as 
follows (Haryanto 1990):
Beta asset = Beta debt (debt/100)
+ Beta equity (equity/100) 
where: beta asset = (0.88)(1.15) = 1.00
beta debt = 0.4, average beta for debt,
debt = 60%
equity = 40%
beta equity = ((1.00) - (0.40)(0.60))/(0,40) = 1.9 
The CAPM equation for 1989 could be written as:
Ks = Rf + Beta equity (Rm - Rf)
= 7.9 + (1.9)(8.2) = 22.9%.
Realizing that the minimum rate of return expected by 
the investor is selected based on other factors deemed 
important to the investor that may not have been captured
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under the CAPM equation, and since the companies involved 
with the Mifergui Joint Project are not American companies, 
the minimum rate of return used for the study is assumed to 
be 22%. This rate is close to the nominal minimum rates
stated to be acceptable by foreign investors in the mineral
industry.
The minimum rate of return expected by the investors of 
the Mifergui Joint Project has not been an
issue during the negotiations.
4.3 The Base Case Cashflow Results
(before taxes)
Given the parameters and assumptions of the Mifergui 
Joint Project, discounted cash flow analysis is performed 
to determine if the project is indeed economic and has 
the potential to generate tax revenue while satisfying the 
expected returns to the foreign investors.
Results of cash flow calculations suggest that the 
project is economic and can generate revenue to the 
governments. Cash flow calculations are in Appendix A based 
on the nominal minimum rate of return of 22%.
The project generates before tax cashflows with a net 
present value of $12 million and a DCFROR of 27.2%. The 
payback period is 4.10 years. This is the time required for 
undiscounted positive project cash flow to cover negative
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project cash flow from acquisation and/or development.
As can be observed from Figure 4.3, beginning in the 
year 2001, the government could generate tax revenue if 
appropriate fiscal policies are identified.
The following chapters are devoted to determining an 







-29.41 - 11.36 -0.81 5.52 9.7 11.69
Figure 4.3 Present Value of Cumulative Before Tax Cash 
Flows (in 1987 million dollars)
Source: Produced by the Author
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Chapter 5
THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE FISCAL REGIMES
Based on the results of the before tax cashflows, the 
project is economic. It can generate profits, assuming the 
parameters and assumptions developed in the early chapters.
In order to meet the demands that some form of tax 
revenue be available to the governments as hosts to the 
project, a series of alternative tax regimes are levied on 
the Mifergui Joint Project in order to determine a more 
effective means to generate tax revenue. The alternatives 
considered are royalty payments, income taxation, equity 
participation by the governments, and a combination of the 
above forms.
5.1 Royalty Regime
From the perspective of the project, the governments 
are currently requesting a royalty of 7% as owners of the 
iron ore deposits.
Assuming a rate of 7%, a cash flow analysis is 
performed in order to determine the impact on the cash 
flows and the economics of the project. While the 
governments would like to receive tax revenue, they also 
would like to attract and encourage foreign investment. 
Therefore, any form of taxation must not affect the "go/no
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go" decision on investment.
As stated in Chapter 2, a royalty affects the project 
cost analogous to a rise in the cost of extraction. Since a 
grade assumption has not been made, a royalty will not 
affect the cut-off grade, but will directly affect the 
revenue available to meet other costs of the project.
The results of the analysis show that an imposition of 
a royalty at 7% immediately depresses the economic variables 
of the project as NPV drops to -$19 million and the rate of 
return decreases to 15.4%. These rates are below the 
required rate of return. The cash flow calculations are in 
Appendix B.
Although a royalty assures a steady flow of revenue to 
the governments of $5.9 million in the first year and $6.3 
million for the following years, an imposition of royalty 
would kill the project, driving away investors. Therefore, 
this form of alternative fiscal regime will not be feasible 
under the circumstances. Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative 
present values of royalty based cash flows (7% royalty).
The net values are negative for each year.
At a lower rate, however, the project could generate 
royalties and still be economic. Analysis shows that a 
royalty rate of not more than 2.5% could generate revenue to 
the governments and yet maintains a marginal NPV of $1 
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Figure 5.1 Present Value of Royalty (7%) Regime
Cumulative Cash Flows, (in 1987 million 
US dollars)
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Figure 5.2 The Rate of Royalty versus the DCFROR 
Source: Produced by the Author
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disadvantage of this scenario (2,5% royalty rate), is that 
at higher prices, the governments will not be able to 
capture higher royalty payments.
5.2 Income Tax Regime
Although the income tax on the books in Liberia is 50%, 
the general rate normally apply is around 46%. The income 
tax rate in Guinea is believed to be around this rate also. 
Now, assuming that a corporate income tax of this level is 
levied on the Mifergui Joint Project, and that the project 
stands alone, the project rate exceeds the minimum 
acceptable DCFROR and NPV, with an NPV of $2.5 million and  ̂
23.4%.
In terms of tax revenue to the governments, they stand 
to collect $208 million during the life of the project, 
assuming the price level remains constant.
The implication of this alternative, however, is that 
tax revenue to the governments will not be forthcoming until 
after the 8th year. The governments are uncomfortable with 
such a period without project revenue. On the other hand, 
the benefits to the economies of the two countries for 
having the project, compared to no project at all, is 
something the governments will have to think about as 
negotiations progress.
The governments will have to realize that the Mifergui
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Project is a regional project between two different 
countries and as such, has a high level of political risk. 
Under these circumstances, there is little possibility of 
receiving early project tax revenue. The investors want to 
recoup their investment as quickly as possible because of 
the uncertainties associated with the project.
The results of cash flow calculations with the income 
tax based regime are enclosed in Aopendix C. The present 
value of the cash flows are presented in Figure 5.3. As can 





















Figure 5.3 Present Value of Income Tax Regime Cumulative 
Cash Flows <in 1987 US million dollars)
Source: Produced by the Author
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5.3 Government Participation Regime
While this form of profit sharing is an alternative 
available to the governments, it does not significantly 
alter potential returns to foreign investors if governments 
pay for their share in the same way other foreign investors 
do. Once equity is offered free to the government, however, 
government participation becomes an additional cost to the 
investor.
The situation with Liberia and Guinea is such that 
these countries do not have the cash to pay for equity in 
the company. The assumption, therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, is that equity of 20% is offered free to the 
governments in return for the rights to mine the ore 
deposits and use the existing mining and port facilities. In 
essence, this is how the current proposals by BRGM and Lamco 
are leaning. The project would be tax free; but after all 
costs, debt and equity service are covered, the surplus, if 
any, would be divided among the governments (Liberian and 
Guinean parties) and new shareholders.
Assuming that the annual net income generated by the 
project after all costs are satisfied will determine how 
much each party will realize as project revenue, the 
governments could receive 20% of the total positive net 
income over the life of the project, a total of about $58 
million. Payments could begin in the 9th year, assuming all
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assumptions come through.
The problem from the government perspective with this 
alternative, as with an income tax, is that the governments 
will be uncertain over timing of revenue. For the Mifergui 
Joint Project, the idea of sharing surplus revenue among all 
parties is preferred by the investors. The governments, 
however, want to be able to receive project revenue once the 
project is operational and producing.
While most firms desire no government participation, 
the common attitude is to offer equity to the government in 
order to reduce uncertainty of government* actions. If the 
governments are offered equity, then a combination of equity 
participation with some form of alternative taxation could 
reap maximum tax revenue to the governments.
5.4 Mixed Regime
In the mixed regime, the government combines royalty 
and income taxes with equity participation.
While this form of fiscal regime is not uncommon among 
governments, the impact of such a regime can be enormous on 
the cash flows and on the economics of the project if the 
rates are higher than a certain level. Analysis of the 
Mifergui Joint Project shows that the combination of royalty 
at 7%, income tax at 46%, and free equity participation of 
20% depresses the economics of the project. The NPV
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decreases to -$23 million and the DCFROR drops by nearly 50% 
to 11,7%. The project is immediately uneconomic as the 
immediate decision criteria are all negative.
The cash flow calculations for this scenario are in 
Appendix D. The present value of the mixed based cash flows 




-3 0  -
-4 0
0 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
'<32.14 -31.79 -27.91 -25.38 -24.04 -22.96
Figure 5.4 Present Value of Mixed Regime Cumulative 
Cash Flows (in 1987 US million dollars)
Source : Produced by the Author
On the other hand, analyses were done for the mixed 
based regime scenario with much lower rates with the view 
that such a scenario could be effective. A royalty rate of
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1.5% was considered with free equity of 10% and an income 
tax rate of 25%. These rates appear to be more effective in 
capturing a reasonable portion of the resource rent without 
driving the anticipated rate of return below the minimum 
required by the investors. The NPV is a positive $1 million 
and the DCFROR is 22.5%, which is just about equal to the 
minimum expected rate on investment. Cash flow calculations 
of this scenario are in Appendix E. and cumulative net 
present values presented in Figure 5.5.
The good thing about this scenario is that it assures 
the governments of project revenue in the initial years of 
about $1.3 million in the first year and $1.4 million in the 
subsequent years until the 10th year when the amount is 
increased by $3,9 million. Total revenue to the government 
would amount to $147 million.
The potential disadvantage of this scenario is that it 
makes the project very marginal. Therefore, the project 
could be easily dropped when compared to other projects with 
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Figure 5.5 Present Value of Mixed Regime Cumulative
Cash Flows at 1.5% Royalty, 25% Income Tax 
and 10% Government Equity (in 1987 US 
million dollars)
Source : Produced by the Author
5.5 Results of Alternative Project 
Assumptions
The effect of price variations and changes in the 
operating and investment costs on the alternative fiscal 
regimes were analyzed.
The analyses increase and decrease the price level and 
vary the operating and investment costs. The objective of 
the analyses is to determine the sensitivity of the project 
to the variations in price and costs.
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5.5.1 Effect of Variations In The Price 
Level
Although iron ore prices are much more stable than many 
other mineral commodities, assumptions were made with 
reference to price in order to determine its impact.
The analysis shows that the project is very sensitive 
to price change and therefore vulnerable in a period of 
depressed prices. A 10% increase in the price of iron ore 
leads to 91% increase in NPV and 51% increase in DCFROR. On 
the other hand, a 10% decrease in price leads to a decrease 
of 109% in NPV and 64% decrease in DCFROR.
Table 5.6 shows the NPV and DCFROR with variations in 
price. It is assumed that production, operating costs and 
capital costs are held constant.
Table 5.6 The Effect of Iron Ore Price Variations on 
NPV and DCFROR
Price ($) NPV (million$) DCFROR (%)
12.00 -76.40 0.77
13.50 -34.84 8.49
15.00 (base case) 3.25 23.81
16.50 37.27 49.02
18.00 67.28 82.36
Source: Produced by the Author
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5.5.2 Effect of Variations In Operating 
and Investment Costs
The project is equally sensitive to variations in
operating and capital costs. As is observed from Table 5.7,
a 10% increase in the operating costs leads to an incredible
182% decrease in the NPV and a 64% decrease in the before
tax rate of return. On the other hand, a 10% decrease in the
operating costs leads to 68% increase in the NPV and 34%
increase in the rate of return.
Table 5.7 Effect of Change in the Operating Costs 















Source: Produced by the Author
Altering capital costs has a similar impact on project 
profitability. A 10% decrease in capital costs leads to an 
87% increase in NPV and a 55% increase in the DCFROR. On the 
other hand, a 10% increase in capital costs leads to an 118% 
decrease in the NPV and 54% a decrease in DCFROR. Table 5.8 
illustrates the impact of changes in capital costs on NPV
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and DCFROR













Source: Produced by the Author
The possibility of a "sliding royalty" would be helpful 
for the Mifergui Joint Project only if prices increase. 
Royalty rates would gradually rise with price above $15./mt.
All these sensitivity analyses show that it is 
essential for public policies to be based on careful 
analysis of all sectors likely to be affected by the policy 
with the view of weighing the benefits against the costs. 
Unless benefits from a policy outweigh its costs, 
implementation can be counterproductive.
For most developing countries, effective analysis of 
mineral projects with the view of implementing effective 
mineral policies is lacking. As a result, policies are often 
counterproductive.
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It is hoped the governments would be wise to realize 
that a royalty rate of 7% (while this is better for 
government revenue assuming the project would be developed 
in any event) is just too high for the Mifergui Joint 




Economic analysis of mineral taxation policies in 
developing countries suggests that governments should tax 
away the resource rent. By the same token, any taxation 
policy that does not account for the trade-off between tax 
rates and future investment in exploration and development 
of new deposits will be counterproductive. Though income 
taxes and royalties are the main elements of fiscal regimes, 
other tax forms can play a role in providing incentives for 
investment in the mining sector.
Income taxes and royalties affect the behavior of the 
mining firm differently. An income tax is neutral and does 
not affect the production decision of an existing operation, 
as long as costs are appropriately defined. A royalty, on 
the other hand, influences the production decision by 
increasing marginal operating costs.
An income tax rate that affects the expected rate of 
return is likely to discourage future investment in mineral 
exploration and development.
Government equity participation, is not of a burden on 
the foreign investor if the government pays the supply price 
of investment for its shares. The common attitude of firms, 
however, is to offer government participation either free of
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charge or at less than market value to reduce the 
uncertainty of government actions.
In the case of the Mifergui Joint Project, the 
imposition of a royalty immediately reduces the 
attractiveness of the project by reducing the cash flows.
The net present value of the project with the imposition of 
7% royalty is -$19 million and the DCFROR is 15.4%. These 
numbers are well below the minimum rate of return assumed 
for the project investment. On the other hand, a royalty 
rate that is not more than 2.5% is feasible and can generate 
revenue for the governments without driving expected returns 
below minimum acceptable rates. However, a royalty at 2.5% 
could reduce the incentives to search for new deposits and 
develop existing ones.
Analysis of the Mifergui Joint Project under an income 
tax regime shows that the governments could reap high tax 
revenue by simply being a taxing agent. The imposition of an 
income tax at the rate of 46% does not reduce DCFROR below 
the assumed expected minimum return of the investor.
However, for the first 8 years, the project will not realize 
positive income due to the burden of high operating costs 
and principal and interest payments. During these years, the 
governments will not receive income tax revenue; but 
governments will receive revenues in the later years 
assuming prices remain at the level considered for the
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study.
The important point here is that the investors want to 
repatriate their profits as quickly as possible owing to the 
uncertainties associated with the project. Although a fiscal 
system based on income taxation is appealing, it does not 
meet the desire of the governments to start receiving 
revenue as early as possible.
Assuming that the host governments of Guinea and 
Liberia were offered free equity participation of 20% of the 
net income as an alternative form of revenue generation, the 
analysis shows that the governments will still have a 
problem similar to the income tax scenario plus lesser 
revenue.
The mixed fiscal alternative at the rates given will 
have a shrinking effect on the cash flows, reduce NPV and 
ROR and result in a longer payback period. On the other . 
hand, a mixed regime with low rates such as 1.5% royalty,
10% free equity, and 25% income tax is effective enough to 
yield tax revenue to the governments in the initial years as 
well as in later years. This scenario is the best of the 
other scenarios reviewed. Although it is unlikely that free 
equity will be offered to the governments, they will have 
the option to either increase the income tax to 46% or 
increase the royalty to 2% and yet maintain the expected 
rate of return to the private investor in excess of the
ARTHUR LAKES LIhiUih, 




The conclusion of this study rests on the fact that in 
view of all the assumptions and parameters, the Mifergui 
Joint Project is economic and that the governments are in a 
better position, compared with the other alternative fiscal 
regimes to consider the minimum mixed regime as it assures 
steady royalties in the early years and income tax revenue 
in the later years.
With regard to the purpose of this study, the minimum 
mixed regime comes close to satisfying all the governments* 
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Shareholders of Participating Companies of 
Mifergui-Nimba as of June, 1984
Company Share of
B stocks
Associated ore Mining Co., Ltd
Ikoye, Lagos/Nigeria ........................  16.46%
Libyan Arab Peoples Socialist Jamaheyria
General Corporation for Iron and Steel . . . .  8.47%
Société Nationale de Recherches of d' Exploitations 
Minières, SONAREM (Alger)............ 6.19%
Institute Nacionale de Industria-INI (Spain) . 3.39%
Entreprise d'Etat pour le Commerce Extérieur 
(Romania).    . . . . . .  2.11%
Metalurski Kombinat Zeljezara Sisk (Yugoslavia) 3.56%
Mifergui Japan Corporation (Japan)............ 1.78%
Société Lorraine et Méridionale de Laminage
Continu SOLMER (France). ....................  1.70%
Union Siderurgigue du Nord et de l'Est de le
France USINOR (France) ......................  1.70%
National Investment Commision (Liberia). . . . 0.22%
United States Steel Corporation (U. S. A.) . . 4.42%
50.00%
Source: The TEX Report. 1988
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APPENDIX B 
The Base Case Cash Flows 
(Before-tax cash flows)
File: AiLIBBRIA.SBB Date: 01/01/80 Time: 06: 45:45
NPV =$12 DCFROR: 27.151 PVR :0.28 Fay Back: 4.03 NROR
Year Time 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Production 2.60 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 39.00 84.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
Net Income 39.00 84.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -23.66 -51.11 -54.90 -54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Total Oper Costs -23.66 -51.11 -54.90 -54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Interest Pit -6.75 -16.15 -15.73 -15.19 -14.59 -13.93
-Princ. Paid -2.39 -5.16 -5.70 -6.30 -6.96
Loan Income 162.00
-Capital Costs -200.00 -28.00
Cash Plow -29.41 -13.66 14.21 14.21 14.21 14.75
Cum n  CP (NPV % it) -29.41 -40.60 -31.06 -23.23 -16.82 -11.36
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
Net Income 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.40 -52.98
-Total Oper Costs -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.40 -52.98
-Interest Pit -13.20 -12.40 -11.51 -10.53 -9.44 -8.24
-Princ. Paid -7.69 -8.49 -9.38 -10.37 -11.45 -12.65
Loan Income
-Capital Costs -28.00
Cash Plow 15.29 15.29 -12.71 15.29 15.71 16.13
Cum PW CP (NPV i it) -6.72 -2.92 -5.51 -2.96 -0.81 1.00
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
Net Income 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -52.98 -52.98 -52.98 -52.89 -52.80 -52.80
-Total Oper Costs -52.98 -52.98 -52.98 -52.89 -52.80 -52.80




-13.97 -15.44 -17.05 -18.84 -10.15
Cash Flow 16.13 16.13 16.13 16.22 26.75 37.20
Cum PN CP (NPV i it) 2.49 3.70 4.70 5.52 6.63 7.90
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue. 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
Net Income 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -52.80 -52.80 -52.89 -52.98 -52.98 -52.98





Cash Plow 9.20 37.20 37.11 37.02 37.02 37.02
Cum PN CP (NPV # it) 8.15 9.01 9.70 10.27 10.74 11.12
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Year 2013 2014 Salvage
Total Production 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00
Net Income 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -52.98 -52.98






Cash Flow 37.02 37.02 83.74
Cum PN CF (NPV i id 11.43 11.69
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APPENDIX C 
The Royalty Regime Cash Flows
(Royalty ® 7%)
File; A:LIBERIA.SEE Date: 01/01/80 Time: 07:04:47
NPV =$-19 DCFROR: 15.4% PVR =-0.36 Pay Back=10.22 HRC
Year Time 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Production 2.60 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 39.00 84.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Royalties -2.73 -5.88 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 36.27 78.12 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70
-Operating Costs -23.66 -51.11 -54.90 -54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Total Oper Costs -23.66 -51.11 -54.90 -54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Dev, IDC -17.50
-Interest Pit -6.75 -16.15 -15.73 -15.19 -14.59 -13.93
-Princ. Paid -2.39 -5.16 -5.70 -6.30 -6.96
Loan Income 162.00
-Capital Costs -182.50 -28.00
Cash Flow -32.14 -19.54 7.91 7.91 7.91 8.45
Cum PN CF (NPV « id -32.14 -48.15 -42.84 -38.48 -34.91 -31.79
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Royalties -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70
-Operating Costs -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.40 -52.98
-Total Oper Costs -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.82 -53.40 -52.98
-Dev, IDC
-Interest Pmt -13.20 -12.40 -11.51 -10.53 -9.44 -8.24
-Princ. Paid -7.69 -8.49 -9.38 -10.37 -11.45 -12.65
Loan Income
-Capital Costs -28.00
Cash Flow 8.99 8.99 -19.01 8.99 9.41 9.83
Cum PN CF (NPV % id -29.06 -26.82 -30.70 -29.20 -27.91 -26.81
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Royalties -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6 JO
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 8L70 83.70
-Operating Costs -52.98 -52.98 -52.98 -52.89 -52.80 -52.80
-Total Oper Costs 
-Dev, IDC
-52.98 -52.98 -52.98 -52.89 -52.80 -52.80




-13.97 -15.44 -17.05 -18.84 -10.15
Cash Flow 9.83 9.83 9.83 9.92 20.45 28.81
Cum PN CF (NPV 1 id -25.90 -25.16 -24.55 -24.05 -23.20 -22.15
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Royalties -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70
-Operating Costs -52.80 -52.80 -52.89 -52.98 -52.98 -52.98








-52.80 -52.89 -52.98 -52.98 -52.98
Cash Flow -3.70 24.30 24.25 24.20 24.20 24.20
Cum PN CF (NPV % id -22.07 -21.36 -20.78 -20.31 -19.93 -19.61
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Year 2013 2014 Salvage
Total Production 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00
-Royalties -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70
-Operating Costs -52.98 -52.98






Cash Plow 24.20 22.36 148.70
Cum PN CP (NPV i id -19.35 -19.03
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APPENDIX D 
The Income Tax Regime Cash Flows
(Income Tax @ 46%)
Year Time Ü 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Production 2.60 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 39.00 34.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs -23.60 -51.11 -54.90 -54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Dev. IOC -17.50
-Interest Pit -6.75 -16.15 -15.73 •15.19 -14.59 -13.93
-Deoreciation •22.86 •26.86 -26.86 -26.86 -26.86 -26.86
-Amortisation -0.75 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50 -0.75
-Loss Forward -32.52 -44.13 -53.12 -61.57 -69.41
Taxable -32.52 -44.13 -53.12 -61.57 -69.41 -75.31
Tax Due
Net Income -32.52 -44.13 -53.12 -61.57 -69.41 -75.31
^Depreciation 22.86 26.86 26.86 26.86 26.36 26.86
^Amortisation 0.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.75
+Loss Forward 32.52 44.13 53.12 61.57 69.41
-Princ. Paid -2.39 -5.16 -5.70 -6.30 -6.96
Loam Income 162.00
-Capital Costs -182.50 -28.00
Cash Flow 













Tear 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Operating Costs 
-Dev, IDC
. -53.82 -53.82 •53.82 -53.82 -53.40 -52.98
-Interest Pmt -13.20 -12.40 -11.51 -10.53 -9.44 -8.24
•Depreeiatiom
Ammxtimatiom
-26.86 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00
-Loam F o m N -75.31 -79.19 -59.41 •38.73 -17.08
Tum blm
• T u  Dm#




Net Income -J9.19 -59.41 -38.73 -M.08 3.28 13.38
^Depreciation
♦Amortisation
26.86 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
♦Loss Forward 75.31 79.19 59.41 38.73 17.08
-Prime. Paid 





Cask Flow 15.29 15.29 -12.71 15.29 12.91 4.73
PV After Tax CF -6.72 -2.92 -5.51 -2.96 -1.19 -0.66
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Operating Costs 
•Dev. IDC














Taxable 26.10 27.57 29.18 35.06 36.90 37.20

















-13.9T -15.44 -17.05 -18.84 -10.15
Cash Flow 4.12 3.45 2.71 0.09 9.78 20.09
PV After Tax CF -0.28 -0.02 0.15 0.15 0.56 1.24
Tear 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00Operating Comtm 
•Dev, IDC 
Imteremt Pit




-4.00 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00 •4.00
Thzable 33.20 33.20 33.11 33.02 33.02 33.02-Tax Due -15.27 -15.27 -15.23 -15.19 -15.19 -15.19








4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Cash Flow -6.07 21.93 21.88 21.83 21.83 21.83PV After T u  CF 1.07 1.57 1.98 2.32 2.59 2.82
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Year 2013 2014 Salvage
Total Production 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00







-Tax Due -15.19 -17.03







Cash Flow 21.83 19.99 15.00
PV After Tax CP 3.00 3.25
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APPENDIX E 
The Mixed Regime Cash Flows 
(Royalty @ 7%, Income Tax ® 46%, & Government Equity @
20%)
Tear Time 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Production 2.SO 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 19.00 84.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total Bojaltiei •2.73 •5.88 •6.30 •6.30 -6,30 -6.30





-51.11 •54.90 •54.90 -54.90 -54.36
-Intereit Put •6.75 •16.15 •15.73 •15.19 -14.59 •13.93
•Depreciation •22.86 •26.86 •26.86 •26.86 -26.86 •26.86
•Amortisation •0.75 •1.50 •1.50 •1.50 -1.50 •0.75
•Lent Forward •35.25 •52.74 68 83 -82.78 •96.92
Taxable 
Tax Due
35 25 •52.71 •68.03 •82.78 -96.92 109.12
let Income 35 25 52.74 •68.03 •82.78 96 92 .109.12
♦Oeprecintiem 22.81 26.86 26.86 26.86 26.86 26.86
♦Amortitttiem 0.75 1.58 1.50 1.58 1.50 0.75








•5.16 -5J8 •6.30 •6.96
Caik Flow •32.14 •19.54 7.91 7.91 7.91 8.45
PV After T u  CF •32.14 •48.15 •42.84 •38.48 -34.91 •31.79
T e u 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2008
Total Prodmetiom 6.00 6.08 6.80 6.08 6.08 6.08
Tbtal Revenue 98.08 98.00 90.00 98.08 90.08 90.00
•Total Royaltiem •6.30 •1.30 •6.30 •6.30 •6.30 •6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.78 83.70 83.70
•Operating Coitn 
•Dev, IDC
•53.82 •53.82 •53.82 •53.82 -53.40 -52.98
Imteremt Pmt •13.20 •12.48 •11.51 •10.53 -9.44 •8.24
Depreciation
•Asortitttiom
•26.86 •4.88 •4.00 •4.00 -4.00 •4.00
Loom Forward •109.12 •119.38 •105.82 •91.44 •76.09 •59.23
Taxable 
T u  Due
•119.38 •105.82 •91.44 •76.09 •59.23 •40.75
Net Income •119.30 •185.82 •91.44 •76.09 -59.23 •40.75
♦Depreciation
♦Amortisation
26.86 4.08 4.08 4.08 4.00 4.08
♦Loss Forward 109.12 119.38 105.82 91.44 76.09 59.23
Prime Paid 





Cash Flow 8.99 8.99 •19.01 8.99 9.41 9.83
PV After T u  CF •29.06 •26.82 •30.70 -29.28 -27.91 •26.81
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.30 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total Royalties -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70 83.70
•Operating Costs 
•Dev, IDC
















Taxable -20.95 0.32 22.88 28.76 30.60 30.90



















-13.97 -15.44 -17.05 -18.84 -10.15
Cask Flow 9.83 9.68 -0.70 -3.31 6.38 16.69
PF After Tax CF -25.90 -25.17 -25.21 -25.38 -25.12 -24.55
Tear 200T 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Prodmetiom 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revemme 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total Royalties -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30 -6.30








-4.00 -4.00 -4.00 •4.00 -4.00 -4.00
Tum ble 26.90 26.90 26.81 26.J2 26.72 26.72
T u  One -12:37 -12.37 -12.33 •12.29 -12.29 -12.29









4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Cask Flow -9.47 18.53 18.48 18.43 18.43 18.43
PV After Tax CF -24.81 -24.39 •24.04 •23.76 -23.53 -23.34
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Year 2013 2014 Salvage
Total Production 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00
-Total Royalties -6.30 -6.30
Net Revenue 83.70 83.70







-Tax Due -12.29 -14.13







Cash Flow 18.43 16.59 15.00
PV After Tax CF -23.18 -22.96
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APPENDIX F
Mixed Regime Cash Flows at 1,5% Royalty, 25% 
Income Tax, and 10% Government Equity
Tear Time 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Prodoctioa 2.60 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Beveaae 39.00 84.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total Bojaltlei -0.59 •1.26 •1.35 •1.35 -1.35 •1.35





•51.11 •54.90 •54.90 •54.90 54 36
•latereat Pit 6 TS •16.15 •15.73 •15.19 •14.59 •13.93
•Depreeiatioa •22.81 •26.86 •26.86 •26.86 •26.86 •26.86
•Aiortisatioa •0.75 •1.50 •1.50 •1.50 •1.50 •0.75
Loaa PoriarW •33.10 •45.98 •56.32 •66.11 •75.31
Tuable 
- T u  Dae
•33.10 •45.98 •56.32 •66.11 •75.31 •82.56
let laeoie •33.10 -45.98 •56.32 •66.11 •75.31 -82.56
♦Depreeiatioa 22.81 26.86 26.86 26.86 26.86 26.86
♦iiertiMtioa 0.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.75
♦loaa PenarW 33.10 45.98 56.32 66.11 75.31
Prime Paid 






•5.16 •5.70 •6.30 •6.96
C u b  Piet •30.00 •14.92 12.86 12.86 12.86 13.40
Pf After T u  CP *•30.00 •42.22 •33.58 •26.50 •20.69 •15.74
T e u 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Prodaetioa 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total l e m u 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total leyiitiee •1.35 •1.35 •1.35 •1.35 •1.35 •1.35
let lofoaw 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65
•Operatiaf Coata 
•Dot. I N
53.82 •53.82 •53.82 •53.82 •53.40 •52.98
•latereat Pit •13.20 •12.40 •11.51 •10.53 •9.44 •8.24
Depreeiatioa
Aaertiutioi
•26.86 •4.00 •4.00 •4.00 •4.00 •4.00
Loaa P o m r d •82.56 •87.78 •69.35 •50.03 •29.72 •7.91
Tuable 
• T u  D u
87 78 •69.35 •50.03 •29.72 •7.91 15.51
•3.88
Wet laeeu •87.78 •69.35 •50.03 •29.72 •7.91 11.64
♦Depreeiatioa
♦Aiortiaatioi
26.86 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
♦Loaa Porurd 82.56 87.78 69.35 50.03 29.72 7.91
Prime Paid 





C u b  Plot 13.94 13.94 •14.06 13.94 14.36 10.90
PV After T u  CP •11.51 •8.04 •10.91 •8.58 •6.61 •5.39
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Tear 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
-Total Royalties -1.35 •1.35 -1.35 -1.35 -1.35 -1.35
Net Revenue 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65 88.65
-Operating Costs 
-Dev, IDC














Taxable 24.75 26.22 27.83 33.71 35.55 35.85

















•13.97 •15.44 •17.05 •18.84 •10.15
Cask Flow 8.59 8.23 7.82 6.44 16.52 26.89
PV After Tax CF •4.60 •3.98 •3.50 •3.17 •2.49 •1.57
Tear 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Production 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
•Total Royalties •1.35 •1.35 •1.35 •1.35 -1.35 -1.35








-4.00 -4.00 •4.00 •4.00 •4.00 •4.00
Taxable 31.85 31.85 31.76 31.67 31.67 31.67
Tax Due •7.96 •7.96 •7.94 •7.92 •7.92 -7.92
Net Incoie 23.89 23.89 23.82 23.75 23.75 23.75






Cask Flow •0.11 27.89 27.82 27.75 27.75 27.75
PV After Tax CF •1.57 •0.94 •0.41 0.01 0.36 0.65
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Year 2013 2014 Salvage
Total Production 6.00 6.00
Total Revenue 90.00 90.00
-Total Royalties -1.35 -1.35
Net Revenue 68.65 88.65







-Tax Due -7.92 -8.92







Cash Flow 27.75 26.75 15.00
PV After Tax CF 0.88 1.17
